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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
FmRsT

AMENDMENT-

FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS

Pentagon Papers. As one of three per curiam decisions' rendered this
term, United States v. New York Times Co.2 especially reflects the
character of the judges of the Second Circuit.3 The court rejected the
4
argument that prior restraint of publication is unconstitutional per se
and remanded for a determination of whether publication of the "Pentagon Papers" posed such a serious threat to national security as to warrant its continued enjoinment.6
PriorRestraints. In the years since Schenck v. United States,6 the first

amendment right of freedom of speech has undergone detailed analysis
by the Supreme Court. In Eisner v. Stamford Board of Education,7 the
court examined this analysis and attempted to "advance formulations
sufficient to bridge past decisions with new facts."" The court was concerned with the following regulation:
The Board of Education desires to encourage freedom of expression
and creativity by its students subject to the following limitations:
IUnited States v. New York Times Co., 444 F.2d 544 (2d Cir. 1971); Sostre v. McGinnis,
422 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971); Scanapico v. Richmond, F. & P. R.R., 439 F.2d 71 (2d Cir.
1971).
2 444 F.2d 544 (2d Cir. 1971) (per curiam).
a The case was considered by the court en banc before Friendly, C. J., and Lumbard,
Smith, Kaufman, Hays, Feinberg, Mansfield, and Oakes, circuit judges. Three of the
judges, Kaufman, Feinberg, and Oakes, dissented. Judge Lumbard, who was among the
majority, has since retired and been replaced by Judge William H. Mulligan. (July 20,
1971).
4 In view of the "heavy presumption against" prior restraint, the basis upon which
the Supreme Court subsequently resolved the issue, sub nom. United States v. Washington
Post Co., 401 U.S. 8018 (1971), the fact that a per curiam decision was rendered might be
quite significant. The question necessarily arises whether the circuit court used a per
curiam, 5-3, decision as a means of expressing consensus or as a means of avoiding meaningful study. The Supreme Court also rendered a per curiam decision; however, there
were simultaneously nine separate opinions.
5 The New York Times applied for a writ of certiorari which was granted. See 403 U.S.
713 (1971). For an in depth study of the case and its surrounding events, see Note, The
Purloined Pentagon Papers and Prior Restraint: The Press Prevailed!, 46 ST. JOHN'S LAW
REvmw 81 (1971).
6 349 US. 47 (1919). The Court here, in an opinion by Mr. Justice Holmes, established
the famous "clear and present danger" standard. However, in the years immediately following this decision, the Court applied the standard less strictly than was contemplated
by Holmes. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372-80 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring); Gitlow v. New York, 268 US. 652 (1925); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616
(1919). The Court, in later decisions, reversed that trend. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 895
US. 444 (1969); Bond v. Floyd, 385 US. 116 (1966); Noto v. United States, 367 US. 290
(1961); Yates v. United States, 854 U.S. 298 (1957); Dennis v. United States, 341 US. 494
(1951).
7 440 F.2d 803 (2d Cir. 1971).
8 Id. at 804 n.1.
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person shall distribute any printed or written matter on
grounds of any school or in any school building unless
distribution of such material shall have prior approval by
school administration.

In granting or denying approval, the following guidelines shall
apply.
No material shall be distributed which, either by its content
or the manner of distribution itself, will interfere with the
proper and orderly operation and discipline of the school, will
cause violence or disorder, or will constitute an invasion of
the rights of others.0

The district court struck down the regulation as a prior restraint
on freedom of expression, and alternatively, as lacking "procedural
safeguards designed to obviate the dangers of a censorship system."'

0

The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the provision was unconstitutional because it lacked a definite procedure for prior submission
of materials for approval and that the prohibition of "distribution" was

unconstitutionally vague. Contrary to the district court, it did not consider the measure an unconstitutional prior restraint."
The Supreme Court in Near v. Minnesota2 was primarily concerned with the censorship effect of prior restraints in the political
marketplace of ideas. 13 It did not therefore declare all prior restraints
invalid per se. 14 On the contrary, it specifically noted certain "exceptional" areas in which government may prohibit speech on the basis of
its content.' 5
OId. at 805.
10 314 F. Supp. 832, 835-36 (D. Conn. 1970).
11440 F.2d at 805.
12283 U.S. 697 (1931).
23 Professor Meiklejohn has proposed that the first amendment's purpose is political
and therefore he distinguishes between public and private speech, only the former being
protected. A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH: AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948),
reviewed, Chafee, 62 HARv. L. REv. 891 (1949). The Supreme Court has indicated that the
expression of political ideas is at the "very center" of the first amendment protections.
See, e.g., Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254 (1964); Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1
(1949). But it is clear that the Court has not adopted Meiklejohn's theory wholesale. For
example, in Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967), the Court held that the first amendment protected a marginally newsworthy, and in no sense political, story at the expense
of a serious invasion of privacy. See Nimmer, The Right to Speak from Times to Time:
First Amendment Theory Applied to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 CALIF. L. REV.
935, 958-67 (1968). Contra, Note, Privacy, Defamation, and the First Amendment: The
Implications of Time Inc. v. Hill, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 926, 940 (1967).
14 283 U.S. at 716.
15 See Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941); Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown,
354 U.S. 436 (1957); Times Film Corp. v. Chicago, 365 U.S. 43 (1961). However, any
restraint that is overbroad, in that it includes areas that would ordinarily be protected
speech under the first amendment, would be declared unconstitutional and void on its
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The court felt that a public school would fall into one of those
"exceptional" areas on the strength of Tinker v. Des Moines School
District.'6 That case upheld the right of high school students to wear
black armbands to protest the Vietnam War. 17 The Supreme Court
there stated that
conduct by the student .. which for any reason ... materially
disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of
the rights of others is, of course, not immunized by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech.' 8
Therefore, the regulation is neither invalid as overbroad and void on
its face; nor is the language unconstitutionally vague. 1
Yet, although the provision was not struck down as an unconstitutional prior restraint, it was defective in its lack of procedure for approval of material to be distributed. The leading case with respect to
procedural safeguards designed to obviate the risks involved in any
prior restraint on speech is Freedman v. Maryland.20 There, the Court
promulgated a threefold test. First, the state must bear the burden of
proof to show that the speech is not constitutionally protected; second,
a judicial determination is necessary before the speech can be censored;
and third, the proceeding must be expeditious.
face. See Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S.
479 (1960); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296 (1940); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
16393 U.S. 503 (1969).
17 Although Tinker might be considered as a precedent for the broad application of
the first amendment rights in the classroom, the better view is that the decision probably
rests on the more narrow ground of evenhandedness. That is, since the regulation singled
out the Vietnam protest to the exclusion of other political opinions, its fatal defect

lay in its specificity.
Clearly, the prohibition of expression of one particular opinion, at least without
evidence that it is necessary to avoid material and substantial interference with
school work or discipline, is not constitutionally permissible.
Id. at 511. Cf. United States v. Brown, 881 U.S. 437 (1965).
Is 393 U.S. at 513. However, the power of school authorities in this area is far from
absolute. That students do not surrender their first amendment rights upon entering
school grounds is clear from the rule that the burden of establishing the reasonableness
of a regulation rests upon the school authorities. See, e.g., Dawson v. Hillsborough
County Florida School Bd., 822 F. Supp. 286 (M.D. Fla. 1971); Turley v. Adel Community
School Dist., 322 F. Supp. 402 (S.D. Iowa 1971); Axtell v. LaPenna, 323 F. Supp. 1077
(W.D. Pa. 1971); Karr v. Schmidt, 320 F. Supp. 728 (W.D. Tex. 1971); Qunham v.

Pulsifier, 312 F. Supp. 411 (D. Vt. 1971).
10 The doctrine of vagueness is similar to that of overbroadness; the reasonable-man
must guess at his peril what is or is not prohibited. Vagueness applies with special significance in the area of free speech. The theory is that the scrupulous avoidance of areas
that might be prohibited has a notable "chilling effect" on the free expression of ideas.

Thus, indirect prohibitions of constitutionally protected speech will not be allowed to
stand. See Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384
U.S. 11 (1966); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964); N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415
(1963); Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction, 368 U.S. 278 (1961).
20380 U.S. 51 (1965).
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In Eisner the Second Circuit felt that it would be an unreasonable
burden upon school officials to initiate court proceedings in order to
curtail activities not consonant with the educational goal. In fact, the
court felt that such a burden would, itself, be "highly disruptive to the
educational process. .. ,"21 But if the student had sought a judicial
determination, it has been held that the school authorities must estab22
lish a reasonable basis for its prohibition.
However, the court did require that the regulation establish a
prompt review procedure. It "must prescribe a definite brief period"
within which the propriety of the submitted material will be deter23
mined.
Finally, the court believed that the term "distribution" was unconstitutionally vague. 24 It held that in order for the regulation to be
valid, it may "require prior submission only when there is to be a substantial distribution of written material .... ,25 Anything less than that
would not provide a reasonable basis for preventing disruption.
Military Rights. It has been a firmly embedded American tradition
that the military be subordinate to the civil government. 26 Yet the civil
courts, cognizant of unique military necessities, have been careful not
27
to interfere with legitimate military affairs.
Traditionally, conflicts have arisen concerning the extent to which
the Bill of Rights is applicable to members of the military.28 Once
21440 F.2d at 810.
22 See cases cited at note 18 supra.
23440 F.2d at 810.
24

See note 19 supra.

25440 F.2d at 811.
26 See Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U.L. Rtv. 181, 183 (1962).
27 The courts have been reluctant to interfere with discretionary judgments made by
the military within the latter's jurisdiction. See, e.g., Orloff v. Willoughby, 845 U.S. 83
(1953); Byrne v. Resor, 412 F.2d 774 (3d Cir. 1969); Schonbrun v. Commanding Officer,
F.2d 371 (2d Cir. 1968); Fox v. Brown, 402 F.2d 837 (2d Cir. 1968); Winters v. United States,
281 F. Supp. 289 (E.D.N.Y. 1968); Sanders v. Westmoreland, 2 S.S.L.R. 3157 (D.D.C. 1969).
"Orderly government requires that the judiciary be as scrupulous not to interfere with
legitimate Army matters as the Army must be scrupulous not to intervene in judicial
matters." Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83 (1953). The courts have also refused to
proceed in cases where the party seeking relief has failed to exhaust all his administrative
remedies. See Craycroft v. Ferrall, 408 F.2d 587 (9th Cir. 1969).
28 [1It is apparent that the protections of the Bill of Rights, except those which
are expressly or by necessary implication inapplicable, are available to members
of our armed forces.
United States v. Jacoby, 11 U.S.C.M.A. 428, 430-31, 29 C.M.R. 244, 246-47 (1960).
It has been held that first amendment rights apply to servicemen, but are more
limited than civilian rights when necessary to reasonably safeguard the national interest.
See United States v. Voorhees, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 509, 16 C.M.R. 83 (1954). "Does being in the
Army curtail or suspend certain Constitutional rights? The answer is unqualifiedly yes."
Raderman v. Kaine, 411 F.2d 1102, 1104 (2d Cir. 1969). Thus, a serviceman's rights are
"conditioned to meet certain overriding demands of discipline and duty." Burns v. Wilson,
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again, these constitutional protections were the subject of judicial scrutiny by the Second Circuit in the case of Cortright v. Resor.29 There
appellees were members of an army band whose mission was to assist
in maintaining morale and effective community relations.
Appellee Cortright, along with others in the band, had circulated
and signed a petition opposing United States involvement in Vietnam.
The band's leader admonished the band and warned them that higher
officers knew of the signatures. Later, appellee and others distributed
a second petition. However, after the new band leader discussed it with
individual members and the band as a whole and warned of possible
repercussions, Cortright told the civilian sponsors not to publish the
names of band members. A final incident occurred while the band was
leading a Fourth of July parade. Appellee's fiancee and the wives of
four other band members marched behind the parade carrying anti-war
346 U.S. 137, 140 (1953). Where first amendment rights are involved, "the issue always
involves the balancing... of the competing private and public interests at stake in the
particular circumstances." Dash v. Commanding Gen., 307 F. Supp. 849, 853 (D.S.C. 1969).
Thus, the courts have recognized a right of the military to restrict the free expression
of servicemen if such restrictions are within reasonable bounds. More often than not, the
need for discipline is given as justification. Yet, it has been suggested that free expression
is not overly detrimental to military needs.
[F]ree expression is not detrimental to the preservation of effective military
discipline. Nothing has been found to indicate that performance of the individual
soldier is significantly impaired by his ideological or political beliefs, or that one
soldier's exposition of political views measurably influences the beliefs of other
soldiers. Some evidence even indicates that free expression may substantially
enhance the realization of important military goals and requirements.
Comment, Military Discipline and PoliticalExpression: A New Look at an Old Bugbear,
6 HaRv. Civ. RIGHTs-Civ. Lm. L. Rxv. 525, 527 (1971).
For a discussion on the traditional view of discipline and the Uniform Code of Military Justice, see Boyce, Freedom of Speech and the Military, 11 UTAH L. Rxv. 240, 257-66
(1968).

It has also been suggested that restrictions upon the right to free expression of
servicemen is justified by the requirement of military subordination to the civil government. See Vagts, Free Speech in the Armed Forces, 57 COLuM. L. REV. 187, 188-89 (1957).
Most of the justifications for limiting the serviceman's freedom of expression have
weathered the passing of time. While civilian constitutional rights have broadened
significantly over the years, the civil courts have allowed the military to restrict the free
expression of servicemen under the blanket of necessity of discipline. It has been suggested
that the application of civilian standards would not result in the loss of discipline and
order. See Lewis, II, Freedom of Speech-An Examination of the Civilian Test for Constitutionality and its Application to the Military, 41 Ml. L. Ray. 55 (1968). Yet others feel
that servicemen should continue to have restrictions placed upon these rights so long as
there is a bona fide military necessity. See Brown, Must the Soldier be a Silent Member of
Our Society?, 43 Mm. L. REy. 71 (1969).
It is evident that there are greater restraints imposed on the soldier's rights to
freedom of speech than are placed on civilians in general. It is submitted, however,
that these restraints, when viewed from the standpoint of the mission of the
armed forces, are reasonable and necessary for both the soldier and his country.
So long as the soldier's right to express himself freely is limited only by recognized
military necessity, this is all that the soldier and the nation can ask.
Id. at 109.
29447 F.2d 245 (2d Cir. 1971), rev'g 325 F. Supp. 797 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
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signs. This resulted in spectator hostility and disorder. Four days later,
the second band leader announced ten duty changes for the band and
attributed them to their anti-war activities. 30
After Cortright and others asked for a rescission of these changes,
they were informed that they were based on sound military judgment
and were in no way punitive. However, the band leader was subsequently reprimanded for representing these changes as punishment.
Thereafter, because the band was believed overstaffed 3x and since
it was believed that Cortright's actions were detrimental to the morale,
discipline and efficiency of the band, Cortright was transferred to the
band at Fort Bliss, Texas. Cortright brought a complaint against his
commanding officer but this was found to be without merit.32
Appellee commenced this action in which the district court issued
33
a writ of mandamus cancelling the transfer order.
The circuit court, in a 2 to 1 decision, reversed and dismissed the
complaint.34 The court first determined that the alleged violation of an
army regulation, stating a policy that changes in station be made only
on military necessity, was not available to appellee since the regulation
5
was adopted for economic reasons and not to protect servicemen. 3
The court then held that the transfer was not an unconstitutional
infringement on first amendment rights. It was determined that although one is not stripped of all his rights by joining the military, still,
30 It appears that up until this time the band had been in a favored position. The
changes were all proper under army regulations. 447 F.2d at 248.
31 Up until August 1969, the authorized size of the band was 64. However, it was
to be reduced to 42 members by May 1970. Id. at 247, 249.
32 Appellee brought that action under Article 138 of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice. 10 U.S.C. § 938 (1964).
33 325 F. Supp. 797 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). This action was commenced the day after appellee
filed his complaint with the army: the proceedings were held in abeyance until the
army inquiry was completed. Id. at 805.
Five other band members who had received transfer orders to Vietnam and Korea
intervened, but their orders were sustained by the district court.
34 The court did not have to pass on the district court's finding that deprivation
of free speech "almost by definition" satisfies the $I0,000 jurisdictional amount (28 US.C.
§ 1331 (1970), giving original jurisdiction to district courts where the matter in controversy exceeds $10,000 "and arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the
United States") since appellant did not challenge the alternative jurisdiction (28 U.S.C.
§ 1361 (1970), original jurisdiction with regard to manadamus to compel officers, employees,
or agencies of the United States to perform duties owed). The court determined that its
decision would not be affected by the more limited jurisdiction under section 1361.
35447 F.2d at 251. Thus appellee could not depend upon decisions requiring the
military to abide by its own regulations, e.g., Smith v. Resor, 406 F.2d 141 (2d Cir. 1969).
Although the courts have declined to review the merits of decisions within the
area of discretion delegated to administrative agencies they have insisted that
where the agencies have laid down their own procedure and regulations, those
procedures and regulations cannot be ignored by the agencies themselves even
where discretionary decisions are involved.
Id. at 145.
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a soldier's rights are not precisely the same as a civilian's.36 The court
felt that appellee, by arranging for his fianc6e and others to accompany
the band, must have forseen that disorder would follow and was there37
fore subject to discipline although a civilian would not have been.
The court also said that since the orders were legal, the case did not
warrant a finding that there had been a "chilling" of the right to pro3
test. 8

Relying on Orloff v. Willoughby,3 9 the court then concluded that
it should not interfere with transfer orders, valid on their face, without
"a stronger showing than Cortright's. ' ' 40
Judge Oakes, dissenting, conceded that a soldier's rights are more
limited than a civilian's, but felt that, since they are entitled to basic
civil rights and since the courts have some power to interfere with military actions, the court should abide by the trial court's findings unless
41
they are "clearly erroneous.
36 See note 28 supra. Ambiguity has developed around- this issue since the United
States Supreme Court has never decided the same.
One of the missions of the Band, into which Cortright had voluntarily enlisted,
was "to assist in maintaining an effective community relations program through

participation in suitable local events." This had been thwarted .

.

.

. And

General Higgins was entitled to take suitable measures to avoid a similar performance in the future.
447 F.2d at 253.
However, a civilian cannot be convicted of breach of the peace simply for voicing
unpopular views that may create a disturbance. See Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1

(1946).
Accordingly a function of free speech under our system of government is to
invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a
condition of unrest, creates disatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs
people to anger.
Id. at 4.
38 In Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965), the Court granted an injunction to
restrain the defendant from prosecuting or threatening to prosecute for alleged violations
of a statute which by its terms was vague, uncertain, and overbroad. Abstention on the
Court's part would have resulted in a "chilling effect" upon first amendment rights since
such "may derive from the fact of the prosecution, unaffected by the prospects of its
success or failure." However, in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the Court determined that a "chilling effect," in and of itself, was not sufficient to prohibit state action.
Where a staute does not directly abridge free speech, but- while regulating a
subject within the State's power- tends to have the incidental effect of inhibiting
First Amendment rights, it is well settled that the statute can be upheld if the
effect on speech is minor in relation to the need for control of the conduct and
the lack of alternative means for doing so.
Id. at 51.
39 345 US. 83 (1953). In Orloff, the Court determined that it must be "scrupulous
not to intervene with legitimate army matters." Id. at 94.
4
o We hold only that the Army has a large scope in striking a proper balance
between servicemen's assertions of the right of protest and the maintenance of
the effectiveness of military units to perform their assigned tasks ....
447 F.2d at 255.
The court was also fearful that many unmeritorious claims might follow a different
holding. Accord, Schonbrun v. Commanding Officer, 403 F.2d 371, 375 (2d Cir. 1968).
41 Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless dearly erroneous, and due regard

